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Nicar, Stephen B. (Ph.D., Economics)
The Transmission of Fiscal Policy Shocks: International Spillovers and Non-Linearities
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Martin Boileau
My dissertation addresses two issues that have not been adequately addressed in the empirical
literature on the effects of fiscal policy: the possibility that U.S. fiscal policy has economically
significant spillovers to other countries and the possibility that discretionary fiscal policy may have
different effects in recessions and expansions.
In the first chapter I estimate the magnitude and direction of spillovers from U.S. fiscal
policy shocks to Canada, Japan, and the U.K. I find that U.S. government spending and net tax
increases can be either beneficial or harmful for our trading partners. The magnitudes are generally
moderate, with the response to a government spending increase typically an order of magnitude
larger than the response to a net tax increase.
In the second chapter I examine whether the spillovers to Canada vary across U.S. recessions
and expansions and whether the responses vary non-linearly with the size or direction of the change
in U.S. government spending. I find that there are indeed different effects in recession and expansion,
but that the differences are short-lived, lasting no more than a few quarters. The use of a non-linear
empirical model does not seem to matter much in estimating the direction of the responses to an
increase in U.S. government spending, but the magnitudes of the effects on the real exchange rate
and the trade balance are significantly larger than those estimated using a linear model.
In the third chapter I shift the focus to the domestic effects of fiscal policy in Canada.
I compare the responses of several Canadian macroeconomic series to increases in government
spending in recession and expansion. With the notable exception of GDP, I find that the difference
in responses across regimes is generally not significant in a statistical or qualitative sense. For
GDP I find that the response to government spending shocks is negative in both recessions and
expansions, but the magnitude of the response in recession is significantly larger.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The recent global recession has generated debate in academic and policy circles on the effects
of fiscal policy. In the argument over whether the government should attempt to counteract the
recession, and if so how much it should spend, there are some issues that are typically either
accepted as true and significant or dismissed as insignificant, in each case without much evidence.
The focus of this thesis is to address two of these issues: the first is the possibility that fiscal policy
has economically significant spillovers to other countries; the second is the possibility that changes
in fiscal policy may have different effects in recessions and expansions.
With respect to spillovers, their significance was often assumed by policy makers, particularly
in discussion of the need for a global response to the recession. In contrast, the academic focus on
closed-economy estimates of fiscal policy multipliers implicitly dismisses them, at least for the U.S.
Regarding different effects over the business cycle, proponents of increased government spending
or tax cuts generally assume that the effect is larger (and positive) during recession than the effect
would be when the economy is producing at potential. Opponents of stimulus usually assume, if
only implicitly, that there is no difference in effect across the business cycle, so that the effect one
would expect during a recession is the same as it would be at full employment. None of the parties
to these arguments have much empirical evidence to back up their claims.
The three papers included in this thesis provide some of the missing empirical evidence. In
Chapter 2 I examine the effect of U.S. fiscal policy on GDP, the bilateral trade balance, the real
bilateral exchange rate, and short-term interest rate differentials for a subset of the U.S.’s largest
2trading partners - Canada, Japan, and the U.K. In Chapter 3 I look in more detail at the spillovers
for U.S. government spending to Canada. Specifically, I examine whether there are different effects
in recession and expansion and whether the effect varies non-linearly with the size or direction of
the change in government spending. In Chapter 4 I shift the focus from the U.S., which has been
the subject of most current and previous research on the effects of fiscal policy, to Canada and
examine whether the domestic effects of fiscal policy there vary over the business cycle.
The rest of this introduction provides some conceptual background for the issues addressed
in my thesis, as well as a discussion of the previous literature on these topics.
1.1 Spillovers
The United States economy is linked to the rest of the world through goods, factor, and
assets markets. The linkages are reflected in the flows of goods and services in international
trade; in the relationships between goods and factor prices at home and abroad; and in the
asset pricing and capital flow relationships between domestic and foreign assets markets.
Dornbusch and Fischer (1986).
Dornbusch and Fischer’s succinct description illustrates the channels through which U.S. fiscal
policy can spill over to the rest of the world. In the goods market, changes in government spending
can have a direct effect on the trade balance if the government purchases foreign as well as domestic
goods. Fiscal policy can have indirect effects on the trade balance if changes in government spending
and taxes affect the private sector’s consumption decisions as well. To the extent that domestic
fiscal policies affect domestic factor prices, such as wages, the relative price levels between the U.S.
and other countries should change, driving changes in the real exchange rate and real interest rate
differentials. These in turn may drive changes in the trade balance and capital flows between the
U.S. and the rest of the world. Real interest rates differentials may also change if fiscal policies
have a direct effect on the domestic interest rate.
A number of theoretical studies have developed models that can be used to investigate the
3transmission of fiscal policy shocks. The predictions of the models vary, however, based on their
particular structures and assumptions. In a basic undergraduate-textbook version of the Mundell-
Fleming model,1 with fixed prices in the short run and flexible exchange rates, a debt-financed
increase in domestic government spending or a net tax decrease boosts domestic GDP. The resulting
increase in real money demand causes an increase in the domestic real interest rate which leads
to a real exchange rate appreciation. If the Marshall-Lerner condition holds, i.e. the sum of
the elasticities of imports and exports to changes in the exchange rate is greater than one, the
appreciation causes a deterioration of the trade balance. Increased imports at home imply a boost
to GDP abroad. In the version of Frenkel and Razin (1996) – a two-country model – foreign output
and the domestic interest rate rises, but the effect on the exchange rate and trade balance are
indeterminate. The responses depend on the relative magnitudes of domestic and foreign saving
and import propensities, and the domestic and foreign elasticities of money demand with respect
to the interest rate and income.
Microfounded, general equilibrium models that explicitly account for spillovers include Betts
and Devereux (2001), Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2003), and Corsetti and Mu¨ller (2011). As-
sumptions related to the completeness of international asset markets, substitutability between
domestic and foreign goods, and the financing of government expenditures affect the outcomes of
such models. As a result, the only common prediction across these models is that an increase in
domestic government spending increases domestic and foreign output.
I am aware of only a few papers that directly estimate spillover effects in a way similar to
what I do in Chapter 2. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2003) estimate the effect of U.S. fiscal shocks
on GDP and the real effective exchange rate for the U.K., France and Italy from 1975 to 1999.
They find that U.S. government spending increases lead to significant and persistent increases in
foreign GDP, while an increase in net taxes has little to no effect. Spending increases in the U.S.
also cause significant exchange rate depreciations in France and the U.K., with no significant effect
1 See, e.g., Mankiw (2010), appendix to chapter 12.
4for Italy, while net tax increases lead to significant appreciations in the U.K. and Italy, with no
significant effect for France. Arin and Koray (2009) find that U.S. government spending shocks
lead to a decrease in Canadian GDP and a real exchange rate depreciation. Corsetti and Mu¨ller
(2011) find that positive government spending shocks increase output in both the U.K. and the
Euro Area, while causing a real exchange rate depreciation with respect to both. The trade balance
with the U.K. decreases for about four quarters, then becomes positive, while for the Euro Area a
small negative effect on impact quickly becomes positive.
Several recent papers have looked at the effect of U.S. fiscal shocks on the U.S. real exchange
rate, terms of trade and the trade balance, though in each case they estimate the effect relative to
an aggregate of other countries rather than the effect on individual countries. Enders, Mu¨ller, and
Scholl (2010), Monacelli and Perotti (2010), Kim and Roubini (2008) and Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe´,
and Uribe (2007) all find that increases in U.S. government spending or the primary budget deficit
lead to real exchange rate depreciation. Enders, Mu¨ller, and Scholl (2010) and Corsetti and Mu¨ller
(2006) also find that spending shocks decrease the terms of trade. Kim and Roubini (2008) and
Corsetti and Mu¨ller (2006) find that increases in the primary deficit have a small but positive effect
on the current account or trade balance, while Monacelli and Perotti (2010) find a negative effect
on the trade balance. Boileau and Normandin (2008), in a multi-country study including the U.S.,
find that U.S. tax cuts increase the external deficit.
My results from Chapter 2 are somewhat mixed. In contrast to most other studies and
theoretical predictions, I find that the peak and cumulative effect of U.S. spending shocks are
negative for Canadian and U.K. GDP, while positive for Japan. The effect on the real exchange
rate is more in line with other studies, with peak and cumulative depreciations with respect to
Canada and Japan, but an appreciation with respect to the U.K. The trade balance with Japan
and the U.K. unambiguously decreases, supporting the “twin deficits” story found in other papers,
while the effect for Canada starts out positive but becomes negative over time. The one result that
is consistent across countries is a decrease in the short-run interest rate spread.
51.2 Non-Linearities
In Chapter 2 I follow the convention of most of the literature on fiscal policy and estimate the
effects as if they do not vary over the business cycle. But the recent debates about the “multiplier”
on federal spending have really been about the effect during recessions. This is another area in
which empirical evidence is lacking, though several recent theoretical papers have explored non-
linearities that may be triggered by the zero bound on nominal interest rates. For example, using
a New Keynesian DSGE model, Woodford (2011) examines the case where a disturbance in the
financial sector lowers aggregate demand and the zero bound prevents monetary policy from closing
the output gap. Under these circumstances he finds that increased government spending can have
multipliers substantially larger than one. Similar theoretical results have been found by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) and Eggertsson (2011).
While these papers provide guidance for the particular circumstances in which they apply,
they address non-linearity in a state that has rarely happened in the past. It is also possible that
state-dependent effects of fiscal policy arise under less restrictive circumstances. In Chapter 3
I consider this possibility and, extending results from Chapter 2, estimate an empirical model
of non-linear spillovers to Canada with the state of the business cycle determined by a moving
average of GDP growth. Using a threshold vector autoregression model, where the regime switches
discretely based on the lagged value of GDP growth, I get the somewhat counterintuitive result that
government spending shocks have a negative effect on U.S. GDP in recessions but a positive one in
expansions. The peak multipliers are -1.38 and 1.02, respectively. For the spillover variables – trade
balance, real exchange rate, and interest rate spread – the effects in both regimes are qualitatively
similar to those I estimated in Chapter 2 but larger in magnitude. In most cases the difference
in response between regimes is significantly different on impact and few quarters thereafter. In
addition, I find that non-linearities are mostly confined to differences across regimes.
A notable recent paper in the same vein is Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a). Using
a smooth transition vector autoregression, they estimate the domestic effects of U.S. government
6spending in recession and expansion. They estimate peak multipliers for total government spending
of 2.48 in recession and 0.57 in expansion.2 Their methodology differs from mine in that the
transition between regimes occurs smoothly rather than at a particular threshold value of GDP
growth. Afonso, Baxa, and Slav´ık (2011) use a threshold VAR to determine whether the effects of
fiscal shocks differ depending on financial market conditions. Specifically, they define “high stress”
and “low stress” regimes using the IMF’s Financial Stress Index as the threshold variable. For the
U.S. they find that the peak effect of fiscal policy shocks on GDP growth is similar in magnitude
across regimes.
2 They have written a new version of this paper, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b), which calculates average
multipliers across a sample of OECD countries with similar results.
Chapter 2
International Spillovers from U.S. Fiscal Policy Shocks
2.1 Introduction
In response to the global recession that began in late 2007, policy makers called for coor-
dinated fiscal responses, expressing a fear that spillover effects would dilute the effectiveness of
policies pursued in isolation, and, implicitly, that some countries would free ride off of the difficult
political decisions of others.1 Were these policy makers’ beliefs consistent with theoretical predic-
tions and empirical evidence? To date there is little empirical evidence on the magnitude of fiscal
policy spillovers, particularly for the United States. To the existing evidence I contribute estimates
of the spillover effects of U.S. fiscal policy shocks on Canada, Japan and the U.K. from 1974 to
2007.
I find that while spillover effects of expansionary fiscal shocks are not uniform in direction or
magnitude across the countries in my sample, for Canada and Japan they result in economically
significant GDP increases over some portion of the response horizon. For all three countries,
government spending shocks generally have larger effects than net tax shocks. Altogether, the
results support the idea that some countries may benefit significantly from “free-riding” off of U.S.
fiscal policy.
Several recent papers have looked at the effect of U.S. fiscal shocks on the U.S. real exchange
1 See, e.g., the speech by Dominique Struass-Kahn, former managing director of the IMF, at Oesterreichische
Nationalbank, Vienna, May 15, 2009, http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/051509.htm, and the “Dec-
laration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy” (G20 Washington Summit), November 15,
2008, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008declaration1115.html.
8rate, terms of trade and the trade balance, though in each case they estimate the effect relative to
an aggregate of other countries rather than the effect on individual countries. Enders, Mu¨ller, and
Scholl (2010), Monacelli and Perotti (2010), Kim and Roubini (2008) and Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe´,
and Uribe (2007) all find that increases in U.S. government spending or the primary budget deficit
lead to real exchange rate depreciation. Enders, Mu¨ller, and Scholl (2010) and Corsetti and Mu¨ller
(2006) also find that spending shocks decrease the terms of trade. Kim and Roubini (2008) and
Corsetti and Mu¨ller (2006) find that increases in the primary deficit have a small but positive effect
on the current account or trade balance, while Monacelli and Perotti (2010) find a negative effect
on the trade balance. Boileau and Normandin (2008), in a multi-country study including the U.S.,
find that U.S. tax cuts increase the external deficit.
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2003) is the closest to what I do here. They estimate the
effect of U.S. fiscal shocks on GDP and the real effective exchange rate for the U.K., France and
Italy from 1975 to 1999. They find that U.S. government spending increases lead to significant and
persistent increases in foreign GDP, while an increase in net taxes has little to no effect. Spending
increases in the U.S. also cause significant exchange rate depreciations in France and the U.K., with
no significant effect for Italy, while net tax increases lead to significant appreciations in the U.K.
and Italy, with no significant effect for France.
The introduction of the euro in 1999 and the resulting common monetary policy has moti-
vated work on fiscal policy spillovers among euro-area countries. Beetsma, Giuliodori, and Klaassen
(2006) and Giuliodori and Beetsma (2005) focus on international trade spillovers. Beetsma, Giuliodori,
and Klaassen (2006), using a sample of 14 countries, find that domestic government spending in-
creases and net tax decreases significantly increase imports from other euro area countries, with
spending having the larger impact. Giuliodori and Beetsma (2005), likewise find that expansionary
fiscal shocks in France, Germany and Italy lead to significant increases in imports from other euro
area countries.
92.2 VAR Specification and Identification
I estimate the effects of fiscal shocks using a vector autoregression (VAR) on quarterly data
from 1974:1 - 2007:4. The baseline specification for the VAR is of the form
xt =
p∑
j=1
Ajxt−j + ut, (2.1)
where xt is the vector of endogenous variables, Aj is the coefficient matrix on lag j, ut is the vector of
reduced-form residuals and p is the lag length of the VAR. I start with a baseline specification that
includes U.S. real government consumption and investment (gt), U.S. real net taxes (tt), U.S. real
GDP (yt), foreign real GDP (y
∗
t ), and the real bilateral trade balance (tbt). Alternately, I include
as a fifth variable the real bilateral exchange rate (qt) and the ex-post real short term interest rate
differential (rt − r∗t ). U.S. net taxes are current tax and transfer receipts net of transfer, subsidy
and interest payments. All variables except the interest rate differential are in natural logs and
GDP, spending and net tax variables are per capita. The VAR is estimated in levels, with four
lags, a constant and a linear time trend.
2.2.1 Identification
The residuals from an unrestricted VAR like (2.1) will, in general, be correlated across equa-
tions. As a result, the residuals from the equations for g and t cannot be interpreted as exogenous
fiscal shocks – some method must be used to recover the uncorrelated structural shocks from the
residuals. The relationship between the VAR residuals (ut) and the desired structural shocks (εt)
can be written as
ut = B εt, (2.2)
where E[εtε
′
t] = I. Two popular methods for recovering structural shocks require imposing specific
restrictions on B.2
2 Another approach used in the fiscal policy literature does not identify fiscal policy shocks from measures of total
government spending. Instead, measures of federal defense spending are used as instruments for government spending
and included in a VAR. See Ramey (2011).
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The first method, originally suggested by Sims (1980),3 uses the Cholesky factorization
of the estimated residual covariance matrix (Σ̂u) for B.
4 This imposes a recursive ordering
in which a shock to one variable has a contemporaneous effect on variables following it in the
ordering, but no contemporaneous effect on those preceding it. One problem with this approach
is technical: the impulse responses it generates may not be robust to alternate orderings of the
variables. So the effect of changes in government spending or net taxes on GDP, for example, may
change with the ordering of the variables. The larger the covariance between the residuals of the
model the more sensitive the results will be to reordering. Another problem is conceptual: the
contemporaneous effects it identifies may conflate discretionary policy responses with automatic
changes in government spending or net taxes over the business cycle. For example, government
transfers vary systematically over the business cycle by design and do not reflect discretionary
policy changes. Since changes in the net taxes variable indirectly capture changes in transfers, the
impulse responses to net tax shocks using a recursive identification reflect more than just responses
to discretionary policy changes.
The second method, first used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) in the fiscal policy context,
seeks to deal with the conceptual problem of Cholesky identification by using external information to
identify the contemporaneous response of government spending and net taxes to changes in output.5
They use this information to derive restrictions on B that have the effect of isolating discretionary
policy responses. For government spending they find no systematic response to changes in output
at a quarterly frequency. In addition, they assume that policy makers take at least a quarter
to make any discretionary changes in spending in response to changes in output. As a result,
unanticipated government spending shocks are just the residuals from the spending equation in a
3 Among the studies cited above, Corsetti and Mu¨ller (2006) and Kim and Roubini (2008) use this method.
4 The Cholesky factorization results in a lower triangular matrix P such that PP ′ = Σ̂u. In this case, then,
B = P−1.
5 Among the studies cited above, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2003) and Monacelli and Perotti (2010) use this
identification method.
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VAR. This is equivalent to a recursive ordering with spending ordered before GDP. For net taxes,
they use OECD estimates of the elasticity of taxes and transfers to changes in output to control for
non-discretionary changes in net taxes. These estimates indicate a positive automatic response of
net taxes to changes in GDP. Once the automatic response is controlled for, Blanchard and Perotti
find a negative relationship between net taxes and GDP. A problem with this approach is that the
results may be sensitive to the particular estimates used to control for the automatic responses.
These estimates are obtained from regressions and therefore subject to estimation uncertainty which
is not reflected in the resulting impulse responses.
2.2.2 Sign Restriction Methodology
In this paper I use the sign restriction approach of Mountford and Uhlig (2009) which I believe
avoids the problems associated the identification methods above. The basic idea is to specify
a minimal number of assumptions on what the impulse responses should look like, find a large
number of candidate B matrices that produce impulse responses that satisfy the restrictions, and
calculate point estimates and percentile bands from the resulting distribution of impulse responses.
The advantage of this methodology over the recursive approach is that, like Blanchard and Perotti,
I can specify the restrictions in a way that isolates discretionary policy shocks. In addition, the
results are not dependent on the ordering of the variables. The advantage of this method over the
Blanchard and Perotti approach is that it allows me to deal with the same problems they were
addressing but in a more general way. Rather than specify a particular quantitative structural
relationship a priori based on uncertain estimates of contemporaneous correlations, I generate
many candidate structural relationships that share qualitative implications. This better accounts
for the inherent uncertainty of the estimates.
Specifying the Restrictions
As mentioned above, the key to identifying discretionary policy shocks is controlling for the
automatic response of spending and net taxes to changes in GDP. I accomplish this by following
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Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and first identifying a “business cycle shock” which captures these
automatic responses and requiring government spending and net tax shocks to be orthogonal to
the business cycle shock. To identify a business cycle shock I make one critical assumption: increases
in net taxes do not cause increases in U.S. GDP; if output and tax revenue are both increasing it
must be the result of an improvement in the business cycle. Specifically, I define a business cycle
shock as a positive co-movement in the impulse responses of net taxes and U.S. GDP for quarters
zero through four. In principal, the improvement in the business cycle could be the result of an
increase in government spending. Accordingly, for a business cycle shock I also require that the
increase in net taxes be greater than any change in government spending for quarters zero through
four.6
A “government spending shock” is defined as increase in the impulse response of government
spending for quarters zero through four that is also orthogonal to a business cycle shock. In certain
draws that meet this restriction, it may also be the case that net taxes are decreasing over the
same horizon. This is a fiscal change that is usually considered to have similar qualitative results
as an increase in government spending. As a result, for government spending shocks I also require
that the increase in government spending be greater in magnitude than any change in net taxes
over the same horizon. I define “net tax shocks” analogously: an increase in the impulse response
of net taxes for quarters zero through four that is orthogonal to a business cycle shock and which
is greater than any change in government spending over the same horizon. Government spending
and net tax shocks must also be mutually orthogonal. No restrictions are placed on the impulse
responses of any of the other variables in the system. A summary of the identifying sign restrictions
is provided in Table 2.1.
Generating Candidate Responses
First, it’s useful to note that the Cholesky factorization mentioned above is only one of an
6 The magnitude restrictions included for each of the shocks are intended to deal with what Fry and Pagan (2009)
call the “multiple shocks problem.” See below for additional detail.
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Table 2.1: Identifying Sign Restrictions
Business Cycle Gov’t Spending Net Tax
Shock Shock Shock
U.S. GDP (yt) +
Gov’t Spending (gt) gt < tt + gt < tt
Net Taxes (tt) + tt < gt +
Notes: This table shows the restrictions on the sign and relative magnitude
of impulse responses for each identified shock. The restrictions are imposed
for impact and the following four quarters.
arbitrarily large number of matrices for which BB′ = Σ̂u. As Fry and Pagan (2007) emphasize, each
of these matrices represents a separate structural model, all of which are observationally equivalent
in the sense that they produce residuals with the same covariance structure. To generate each set
of impulse responses, I start with the Cholesky factorization (P ) and multiply by an orthonormal
matrix Q which has the property that Q′Q = QQ′ = I. Accordingly, PQQ′P ′ = Σ̂u. The
sign restrictions I impose are restrictions on the responses of the first three variables in the VAR
(government spending, gt, net taxes, tt, and U.S. GDP, yt, respectively). So the matrix Q that I
construct makes use of a Givens rotation in three dimensions. Specifically, for each set of candidate
responses I draw (θ1, θ2, θ3) from U [0, pi] and calculate
Q3 =

cos(θ1) − sin(θ1) 0
sin(θ1) cos(θ1) 0
0 0 1
×

cos(θ2) 0 − sin(θ2)
0 1 0
sin(θ2) 0 cos(θ2)
×

1 0 0
0 cos(θ3) − sin(θ3)
0 sin(θ3) cos(θ3)
 ,
where Q3 is the upper left 3 × 3 section of Q. The rest of Q consists of ones on the diagonal and
zeros everywhere else.
Potential Problems with the Methodology
Fry and Pagan (2007) and Fry and Pagan (2009) identify and discuss two potential problems
when using the sign restriction methodology: the “multiple shocks problem” and the “multiple
models problem.” The multiple shocks problem arises when a set of responses could have been
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generated by more than one potential shock; not enough information is specified to discriminate
between the potential shocks. An example of this in my case is a shock which produces an increase
on impact and for the following four quarters in both net taxes and government spending. With
only restrictions on the sign of the impulse responses this could be identified as either a government
spending or net tax shock. As mentioned above, I impose additional restrictions on the magnitude
of the responses to deal with this problem.
The multiple models problem arises from the fact that each set of impulse responses represents
a different model of the relationship between the variables in the VAR. One way to present my
results would be, for example, to provide the median response of foreign GDP to an identified net
tax shock, calculating the median with reference to the range of responses of foreign GDP only.
Then I could give the median response of the interest rate differential, calculating the median with
reference to the range of responses of the interest rate differential only, and so on for the other
variables. The problem with this approach is that if I don’t consider the responses of all variables
to a particular shock, there’s no reason to expect that all of the median responses are coming from
the same set of impulse responses. The result for each variable will likely be coming from a different
model. To deal with this, Fry and Pagan (2007) suggest presenting the set of median responses that
are “closest” to the median calculated across all candidate responses that meet the restrictions.
For this paper I generated candidate matrices Q until I had 1000 that each contained a
business cycle, government spending and net tax shock identified using the restrictions discussed
in the paper. After I generated the corresponding impulse responses, I calculated the median and
standard deviation of the responses to both the government spending and net tax shocks at each
time horizon for each variable across all 1000 responses. I then calculate standardized deviations
from the median by subtracting the median and dividing by the standard deviation. I calculate
squared deviations for each variable in each candidate set of responses and then sum across the
variables in that set of responses. This results in a single number that represents how close each
set of responses is to the median across all variables and sets of responses. The set of responses
with the lowest number is chosen as the median in the results I present.
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Table 2.2: Government Spending shock
impact 4 qrts 8qrts 12 qrts 20 qrts peak
Real GDP (%)
Canada 0.07∗ 0.17∗ 0.08∗ -0.08∗ -0.22∗ -0.22∗ (20)
Japan -0.04∗ -0.05∗ 0.16∗ 0.34∗ 0.55∗ 0.55∗ (20)
U.K. -0.04∗ -0.09 -0.06∗ 0.01 0.06∗ -0.15∗ (1)
Trade Balance (%)
Canada 0.27∗ 0.38∗ 0.59∗ 0.63∗ 0.54∗ 0.63∗ (13)
Japan -0.64∗ -2.25∗ -1.25∗ -0.58∗ 0.19∗ -2.41∗ (3)
U.K. -2.08∗ -1.98∗ -1.69∗ -0.96∗ 0.69∗ -2.55∗ (3)
Real Exchange Rate (%)
Canada 0.18∗ -0.40 -0.89∗ -1.30∗ -1.75∗ -1.75∗ (20)
Japan -0.72∗ -0.98∗ -0.98∗ -0.92∗ -1.14∗ -1.14∗ (20)
U.K. -0.11 1.06∗ 0.25∗ -0.13 -0.68∗ 1.19∗ (2)
Interest Rate Differential (basis points)
Canada 8.22∗ -22.43∗ -18.82∗ -9.82∗ -10.58∗ -27.52∗ (5)
Japan 6.83 -30.79∗ -30.25∗ -26.67∗ -1.54 -31.21∗ (5)
U.K. 4.10 -23.70∗ -10.62∗ -9.99∗ -9.35∗ -23.70∗ (4)
Notes:
Response to a one-period, 1% increase in the level of real U.S. govern-
ment spending per capita. An asterisk indicates that zero falls outside
two-standard-error bands. The number in parentheses is the quarter
in which the peak effect occurs.
2.3 Results
Graphs of the impulse responses to a positive government spending shock and a positive net
tax shock are given in Figures 2.1 - 2.4. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provides more detailed numerical results.
Using the sign restrictions explained above, I generated 1000 sets of impulse responses. The point
estimates are the median values across the identified responses. Two-standard-error bands were
calculated from the standard error for each variable’s response across all of the identified responses.
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Table 2.3: Net Tax shock
impact 4 qrts 8qrts 12 qrts 20 qrts peak
Real GDP (%)
Canada 0.000 0.044 0.058∗ 0.036∗ 0.033∗ 0.063∗ (7)
Japan 0.008∗ -0.027∗ -0.069∗ -0.098∗ -0.118∗ -0.118∗ (20)
U.K. 0.013∗ 0.031 0.041∗ 0.052∗ 0.033∗ 0.052∗ (12)
Trade Balance (%)
Canada 0.026∗ 0.118∗ 0.032 -0.048 -0.117∗ 0.128∗ (5)
Japan -0.311∗ 0.069 -0.002 0.053 0.123∗ -0.311∗ (0)
U.K. -0.006 -0.095 0.009 0.097∗ 0.233∗ -0.248∗ (1)
Real Exchange Rate (%)
Canada -0.077∗ -0.235∗ -0.267∗ -0.300∗ -0.354∗ -0.354∗ (20)
Japan 0.134∗ 0.046 0.268∗ 0.360∗ 0.379∗ 0.379∗ (20)
U.K. -0.007 -0.150∗ -0.057 -0.036 -0.095∗ -0.163∗ (3)
Interest Rate Differential (basis points)
Canada 5.011∗ 6.053∗ 4.936∗ 5.430∗ 4.150∗ 8.937∗ (3)
Japan -1.286 5.354∗ 4.754∗ 3.258∗ -0.613∗ 6.703∗ (3)
U.K. 2.640∗ 10.706∗ 9.396∗ 5.232∗ 3.945∗ 10.984∗ (6)
Notes:
Response to a one-period, 1% increase in the level of real U.S. net taxes
per capita. An asterisk indicates that zero falls outside two-standard-
error bands. The number in parentheses is the quarter in which the
peak effect occurs.
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Figure 2.1: Spillover Effect on Foreign GDP
Each graph displays the response to a positive 1% shock to the indicated variable.
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Figure 2.2: Spillover Effect on Trade Balance
Each graph displays the response to a positive 1% shock to the indicated variable.
2.3.1 Foreign GDP
An increase in U.S. government spending initially has a positive effect on Canadian GDP,
peaking at 0.21%, but the effect becomes negative after about 10 quarters. For Japan the ef-
fect alternates between negative and positive for the first 4 quarters, but is consistently positive
thereafter, peaking at 0.55%. The effect on U.K. GDP is negative until around the tenth quarter,
then becomes positive. The peak effect is a decrease of 0.15%. For all three countries, zero falls
outside the two-standard-error bands over most of the response horizon. A temporary increase in
U.S. net taxes has a positive effect on Canadian and U.K. GDP, peaking at 0.063% and 0.052%
respectively. There is initially a positive impact on Japan’s GDP, but the effect becomes negative
after 4 quarters, peaking at -0.118%.
2.3.2 Bilateral Trade Balance
With respect to Canada, the effect of a government spending shock improves the trade balance
and the effect is persistent. An increase in spending leads to a decrease in the trade balance with
19
0 5 10 15 20
−3
−2
−1
0
1
Spending
Ca
na
da
0 5 10 15 20
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
Net Taxes
0 5 10 15 20
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Ja
pa
n
0 5 10 15 20
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0 5 10 15 20
−1
0
1
2
UK
0 5 10 15 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Figure 2.3: Spillover Effect on Real Exchange Rate
Each graph displays the response to a positive 1% shock to the indicated variable.
Japan and the U.K., though the effect becomes positive near the end of the response horizon. The
peak effects are improvements of 0.63% with respect to Canada and a deterioration of 2.41% and
2.55% with respect to Japan and the U.K. In all cases zero falls outside the two-standard-error
bands over most of the response horizon.
With an increase in net taxes the trade balance with Canada initially improves but the effect
becomes negative after nine quarters. The trade balance with Japan initially falls, with a positive
effect occurring around three quarters after the shock. After basically no effect on impact for the
U.K, the effect becomes negative for several quarters and then becomes positive again for the rest
of the response horizon. The magnitude of the effects are smaller than for spending shocks; the
peak effects are improvements of 0.13% for Canada, and a deterioration of 0.25% and 0.31% for
Japan and the U.K.
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Figure 2.4: Spillover Effect on Interest Rate Differential
Each graph displays the response to a positive 1% shock to the indicated variable.
2.3.3 Real Exchange Rate
A government spending shock leads to a persistent real exchange rate depreciation with
respect to both Canada and Japan. For the U.K., a depreciation on impact quickly becomes an
appreciation and then a depreciation again after ten quarters. The peak effect ranges from a
1.19% appreciation relative to the U.K. (eventually becoming an 0.68% depreciation) to a 1.14%
depreciation relative to Japan to a 1.75% depreciation relative to Canada. A net tax increase
results initially in a depreciation again with respect to Canada, but an appreciation with respect
to Japan and a depreciation with respect to the U.K. Once again, the peak effects are significantly
smaller than for government spending shocks: depreciations of 0.35% and 0.16% with respect to
Canada and the U.K., and an appreciation of 0.38% with respect to Japan.
2.3.4 Interest Rate Differential
For all three countries, a positive spending shock leads to a decrease in the interest rate
differential. This implies a decrease in the U.S. rate, a decrease in the foreign rate or both. Net
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tax shocks have the opposite result for all three countries. The peak effects for spending shocks are
-28, -31 and -23 basis points for Canada, Japan and the U.K. respectively. For net tax shocks the
peak effects are 9, 7 and 11 basis points for Canada, Japan and the U.K. If the effect of net tax
decreases is symmetric to that of increases, then this is the only variable for which the estimated
direction of the effect is consistent across both types of “expansionary” shocks.
2.3.5 Sign Restriction vs. Other Identification Methods
In this section I consider the results generated from the sign restriction identification relative
to those generated by recursive identification and the Blanchard and Perotti methodology. For the
recursive identification the U.S. variables were ordered government spending, net taxes, then GDP.
For the Blanchard and Perotti methodology I used the values reported in their paper to estimate
a VAR using my data sample. Figure 2.5 shows the results for government spending shocks and
Figure 2.6 shows the results for net tax shocks. Since there is no reason to think that the relative
difference in identifications should vary by country, I only report results for the U.S. - Canada
specifications.
From the figure it is clear that the government spending shocks identified from the sign
restriction approach generate nearly identical responses to those identified by a recursive ordering
with government spending ordered first. For the Blanchard and Perotti methodology, the shape of
the responses is very similar, but the magnitudes on impact are smaller. For the foreign variables,
this is the result of additional zero restrictions I had to impose to identify the model.7 For all of
the variables except the GDP variables, the Blanchard and Perotti responses track the recursive
and sign restriction responses very closely after the first few quarters. For U.S. and Canadian
GDP, the magnitude of the response is lower than the recursive and sign restriction responses for
about eight quarters. Overall the similarity of the recursive and sign restriction results supports
Blanchard and Perotti’s finding that there are no systematic changes in government spending in
7 In Blanchard and Perotti (2002) they estimate a three-variable VAR consisting only of U.S. government spending,
net taxes, and GDP.
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Figure 2.5: Impulse Responses by Identification Method: Government Spending
Each graph displays the response to a positive 1% shock to U.S. Government Spending.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse Responses by Identification Method: Net Taxes
Each graph displays the response to a positive 1% shock to U.S. Net Taxes.
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response to GDP at a quarterly frequency. As a result, it does not seem to matter which of the
methods are used to estimate responses to government spending shocks.
A much clearer difference is evident with the responses of U.S. and Canadian GDP to net tax
shocks. In the case of U.S. GDP, the response on impact to a positive net tax shock is negative for
both the sign restriction and Blanchard and Perotti approaches while in the recursive specification
it positive. This difference in responses supports the conclusion that a simple recursive specification
does not adequately control for automatic co-movements in net taxes and GDP. With Canadian
GDP, the three identification methods all show a positive effect but the recursive specification
shows a larger effect on impact and much larger peak effect. This difference is likely driven by
the difference in responses for U.S. GDP. For the trade balance, real exchange rate, and interest
rate difference the qualitative results for each identification method are similar: an increase in the
trade balance, depreciation of the exchange rate, and increase in the interest rate difference. The
sign restriction approach generates responses whose magnitudes typically fall between the recursive
and Blanchard and Perotti methods. Overall, the identification method makes a difference for
identifying the effects on GDP, but not so much for the other variables.
2.3.6 Open Economy vs. Closed Economy Multiplier
In this section I compare the estimated multipliers on U.S. fiscal policy shocks in a closed-
economy empirical model relative to an open-economy model. Basic economic intuition suggests
that the multipliers on government spending and net tax shocks should be smaller in an open
economy since any change in private demand that results from changes in fiscal policy will fall in
part on imports rather than domestic production. Table 2.4 shows numerical results for the two
specifications, while Figure 2.7 shows the impulse responses.8
The peak effect of a one-dollar increase in government spending is a $1.23 increase in U.S.
GDP in both specifications and occurs on impact. In the open-economy specification, however,
8 The open-economy specification includes Canadian GDP and the U.S.-Canada trade balance as the foreign
variables.
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Figure 2.7: Closed Economy vs. Open Economy IRFs
Each graph displays the response of U.S. GDP to a positive 1% shock to the indicated variable.
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Table 2.4: Open vs. Closed Economy Multipliers
impact 4 qrts 8qrts 12 qrts 20 qrts peak
Open Economy
Spending 1.23 0.48 0.16 -0.30 -0.50 1.23 (0)
Net Taxes -0.35 -0.17 -0.08 -0.25 -0.19 -0.35 (0)
Closed Economy
Spending 1.23 0.91 0.40 0.21 0.17 1.23 (0)
Net Taxes -0.32 -0.36 -0.16 -0.02 0.02 -0.46 (3)
Notes:
Response, in dollars, to a one-period, $1 increase in the level of real
U.S. government spending or U.S. net taxes per capita. The num-
ber in parentheses is the quarter in which the peak effect occurs.
the effect decreases more rapidly than in the closed-economy specification and becomes negative
after ten quarters. After twenty quarters the effect is a decrease of $0.50 in the open-economy
specification, while in the closed-economy specification the effect is still positive at $0.17. For an
increase in net taxes, one again the peak effects are similar, with a one-dollar increase in net taxes
leading to a peak decrease in U.S. GDP of $0.46 in the closed-economy specification and a peak
decrease of $0.35 in the open-economy specification. In the closed-economy specification the effect
gradually approaches zero, while in the open-economy specification the negative effect persists for
the entire impulse response horizon.
2.4 Conclusion
The response to U.S. fiscal shocks is not uniform across countries or type of shock. In general
the response to government spending shocks is much larger – often an order of magnitude – than the
response to net tax shocks. Qualitatively, the effect of spending shocks are sometimes expansionary
for the foreign country. For example, U.S. spending shocks lead to significant increases in GDP in
both Canada and Japan over some part of the response horizon, though in Canada they eventually
lead to decreases. Net tax increases are expansionary for Canada and the U.K. over most of the
horizon, though they are contractionary for Japan after about 4 quarters. Spending increases lead
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to real exchange rate depreciations with respect to Canada and Japan, an appreciation with respect
to the U.K., and improve the trade balance with Canada, but not with Japan and the U.K. Net tax
increases cause exchange rate appreciations with respect to Japan but depreciations with respect
to Canada and the U.K. For Canada and the U.K. net tax increases have the same effect on the
trade balance as spending increases. But again, for both the real exchange rate and trade balance
the magnitudes are much smaller than for spending shocks.
This paper relied on an identification method for fiscal shocks that has conceptual benefits
over other common identification methods. As a practical matter, however, when government
spending shocks are identified from total government spending and investment in a VAR each
of the three identification methods discussed produces similar results. For net tax shocks the
identification method matters, particularly for the short-term responses.
Chapter 3
Non-Linearities in U.S. Fiscal Policy Spillovers
3.1 Introduction
The recent recession generated a spirited debate on the desirability and effects of fiscal pol-
icy. While this debate has been specifically about the effect of fiscal policy during recessions, the
majority of past and recent research on fiscal policy has relied on linear empirical or theoretical
models. These models, by construction, do not allow for different effects for fiscal policy across
the business cycle. In this paper I examine non-linear responses to fiscal policy in the context of
the international transmission of shocks. Specifically, I extend my earlier work on the international
transmission of fiscal policy shocks from the U.S. to Canada to allow for different responses in
recessions and expansions. I also consider other forms of non-linearity in the responses: within
each regime I consider whether the economy responds differently to positive shocks than negative
shocks and whether the size of the response increases proportionately with the size of the fiscal
shock. I find that there are different effects in recession and expansion, but that the differences
are not significant beyond a few quarters after the shock. I also find that for some variables the
response to positive and negative spending shocks differs in the recession regime as well as the
degree to which the response changes in proportion to the size of the shock.
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3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Threshold Vector Autoregression
To allow for different responses to fiscal shocks across the business cycle, I employ a variation
on a traditional vector autoregression called a threshold vector autoregression (TVAR). This is a
form of regime-switching regression in which the VAR coefficients are allowed to vary discretely
across an arbitrary number of regimes, defined with reference to values of a “threshold variable.”
The regime that the model is in at any point in time is determined by the (usually lagged) value
of the threshold variable at that time and within each regime the model is linear. In the discussion
that follows, the lag at which the threshold variable causes regime shifts is called the delay (d) and
the value of the threshold variable at which regime shifts occur is called the threshold value (γ).
Although the business cycle can in principle be divided into more than two regimes, to
minimize the number of parameters to be estimated I consider a model with two regimes – one
for expansion (E) and one for recession (R). A TVAR incorporating these two regimes has the
following specification:
Yt = A
EYt +B
E(L)Yt−1 + (ARYt +BR(L)Yt−1)I(thresht−d < γ) + Ut. (3.1)
Yt is the vector of endogenous variables, B
i(L) is the lag polynomial matrix of coefficients for regime
i ∈ {E,R}, Ai represents the contemporaneous relationship between the endogenous variables in
regime i, and Ut are the structural disturbances. I(·) is an indicator function equal to one for the
recession regime and zero otherwise. As discussed in further detail in Section 3.3.1, I alternately
use functions of U.S. and Canadian real GDP growth as the threshold variables (thresht), so a
recession regime occurs when U.S. or Canadian GDP growth, lagged d periods, falls below some
threshold γ that is estimated along with the other parameters of the model.
The specification in (3.1) illustrates a couple of features that make a TVAR model useful
for my analysis. First, conditional on the regime the model is linear in its parameters and is
straightforward to estimate via least squares. Second, by defining the threshold variable as a
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function of one of the endogenous variables I can model regime-switching as an endogenous process.
This implies that shocks to any of the variables in Yt may – via their impact on the variable
underlying thresht – induce a shift between the recession and expansion regimes which can be
reflected in the impulse responses.
3.2.2 Non-Linear Impulse Responses
Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) identify three properties of linear impulse response func-
tions that make them unsuitable for analyzing non-linear models such as a TVAR. The first is
a symmetry property : in the context of my model, this means a negative one-standard-deviation
shock to government spending has exactly the opposite effect of a positive one-standard-deviation
shock. The second is a shock-linearity property : a two-standard-deviation shock has exactly twice
the effect of a one-standard-deviation shock. Third, and perhaps most important for my analysis,
is a history independence property : the effect is the same regardless of whether the shock occurs
during a recession or an expansion.
To deal with the non-linear dynamics implied by a TVAR model I use the Generalized Impulse
Response Function (GIRF) proposed by Koop, Pesaran, and Potter. Defining the impulse response
function as a revision in conditional expectations, the GIRF at time horizon t+ h for an arbitrary
shock ut is
GIRFY (h, ut,Ωt−1) = E[Yt+h|ut,Ωt−1 ]− E[Yt+h|Ωt−1 ], (3.2)
where Yt+h is the vector of endogenous variables at t+ h and Ωt−1 is the information set up to the
period before the shock. This definition implies that the impulse response functions depend on the
initial conditions (i.e. whether the model is in a recession or expansion regime at the time of the
shock) and that there is no restriction regarding the size or symmetry of the shocks.
With this formulation I can explore the full dynamic effects of a shock to government spending
by considering shocks of different sizes and signs, conditional on both the recession and expansion
regimes. To calculate the effect of a shock to government spending during a recession regime, for
example, I use the following algorithm.
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(1) Use the estimated threshold value to identify observations that fall into the recession regime.
These constitute the set of recession “histories” ΩRt−1.
(2) From the set of regression residuals corresponding to the observations in ΩRt−1 randomly
draw, with replacement, a set of h+ 1 innovations, where h is the desired impulse response
horizon.
(3) Using a particular history ωRt−1 ∈ ΩRt−1 as the initial condition and the innovations drawn
in step 2, simulate Yt for t = 0 . . . h using the estimated TVAR coefficients. The threshold
variable is simulated at the same time to allow for regime switching.
(4) Repeat step 3 using the same initial condition and innovations, but replace the first inno-
vation with the desired shock to government spending.
(5) Repeat steps 2 - 4 a large number of times, using the same initial condition ωRt−1. Av-
eraging over all of the simulations results in estimates of the conditional expectations
E[Yt+h|ut, ωRt−1] and E[Yt+h|ωRt−1].
(6) Repeat steps 2 - 5 for each ωRt−1 ∈ ΩRt−1 to get E[Yt+h|ut,ΩRt−1] and E[Yt+h|ΩRt−1].
In the empirical analysis below, I compute four shocks for each regime: positive and negative one-
and two-standard-deviation shocks to U.S. government spending.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Data and VAR specification
I estimate the model using quarterly data for the U.S. and Canada from 1974:1 - 2007:4, start-
ing with a baseline specification that includes U.S. real government consumption and investment
(gt), U.S. real net taxes (tt), U.S. real GDP (yt), Canadian real GDP (y
∗
t ), and the U.S.-Canada
bilateral trade balance (tbt). Alternately, I include as a fifth variable the real bilateral exchange rate
(qt) and the ex-post real short term interest rate differential (rt − r∗t ). U.S. net taxes are defined
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as current tax and transfer receipts net of transfer, subsidy and interest payments. All variables
except the interest rate differential are in natural logs. I estimate the TVAR in levels, including
two lags of the endogenous variables, a constant, and a linear time trend that are all allowed to
vary between the two regimes.1
Because the variables included in the TVAR to capture spillover effects are defined in bilateral
terms, I need to consider the possibility that the dynamics may be affected by the business cycle
in either the U.S. or Canada. Since I also want to allow endogenous regime shifting, the natural
candidates – among variables in my specification – for defining business cycle regimes are U.S. and
Canadian GDP. I consider several variations: the lagged 1-quarter growth rate and moving averages
of 2, 4, 6 and 8 quarters.
The final specification I use for computing impulse responses is the combination of threshold
variable, threshold value and delay that minimizes the log determinant of the regression residuals.
The maximum delay d is set at two to coincide with the TVAR lag order and the set of threshold
values γ is constrained so that each regime contains at least 38 observations.2 I implement this
constraint by sorting the threshold variable observations from lowest to highest then discarding the
first and last 38 observations before estimation. Then for each threshold variable I estimate the
model for every combination of delay and threshold value.
A summary of the results from these estimations is presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Among the
U.S. threshold variables a 6-quarter moving average of GDP growth, lagged one quarter, provides
the best fit for the baseline and real exchange rate specifications. The estimated threshold value is
a quarterly growth rate of 0.56%, which corresponds to an annual rate of around 2.26%. For the
interest rate specification a 6-quarter moving average is also the best fit, but lagged two quarters,
and with an estimated threshold quarterly growth rate of 0.53% (2.13% annual). Using Canadian
1 I selected the TVAR lag order based on the Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC) for the null linear model. Ivanov
and Kilian (2005) find that for impulse response analysis in models with quarterly data, HQC is generally the most
accurate lag-order selection criteria.
2 This minimum number of observations is determined by the number of parameters in each equation (24) plus
10% of the usable sample size (≈ 14).
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Table 3.1: Specification Tests – U.S. Threshold Variable
Threshold Variable
∆yt−d MA(2) MA(4) MA(6) MA(8)
Trade Balance ln |Σu| -44.9176 -44.7914 -44.7507 -45.0059 -44.6753
d 2 2 1 1 1
γ 0.4309 0.7199 0.6142 0.5611 0.5282
Real Exchange Rate ln |Σu| -45.1203 -45.1807 -45.1437 -45.3718 -45.2335
d 2 2 1 1 1
γ 0.4309 0.6931 0.5495 0.5611 0.5842
Interest Rate Difference ln |Σu| -37.8040 -37.8331 -37.7332 -38.0022 -37.9314
d 2 2 1 2 1
γ 0.5169 0.5193 0.5495 0.5282 0.5282
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Table 3.2: Specification Tests – Canada Threshold Variable
Threshold Variable
∆yt−d MA(2) MA(4) MA(6) MA(8)
Trade Balance ln |Σu| -44.7821 -44.9359 -44.6326 -44.6905 -44.7226
d 2 1 2 1 2
γ 1.1215 1.0581 0.8573 0.8854 0.9501
Real Exchange Rate ln |Σu| -45.1148 -45.1251 -44.9866 -44.9945 -45.1262
d 2 1 1 1 2
γ 1.1215 1.0531 0.5188 0.8545 0.9600
Interest Rate Difference ln |Σu| -37.8057 -37.8747 -37.7927 -37.9581 -37.8487
d 2 1 2 1 2
γ 1.1215 1.0581 0.5427 0.8545 0.8894
threshold variables, the best fit varies for each specification. For the baseline specification, a 2-
quarter moving average, lagged one quarter, and a threshold growth rate of 1.0581% (4.3% annual)
provides the best fit. For the exchange rate and interest rate specifications, 8- and 6-quarter moving
averages, respectively, provide the best fit with estimated threshold growth rates of 0.96% (3.9%
annual) and 0.8545% (3.46% annual).
3.3.2 Testing for Non-Linearity
Once the threshold variable is chosen I test the null hypothesis of a single-regime linear
model versus the alternative of a threshold model with two regimes. This test is complicated by
the estimated threshold value γ because this parameter is not present in the null linear model. As
a result, the Wald statistic for testing AR = BR(L) = 0 has a non-standard distribution. To carry
out the test, then, I first estimate the TVAR for each value γ of the threshold variable and calculate
the Wald statistic for no difference in regimes. Next, following Hansen (1996) and Andrews and
Ploberger (1994), I calculate three test statistics: the sup-Wald statistic, which is the maximum of
the Wald statistics calculated for all values of the threshold variable; the exp-Wald, a function of the
sum of exponential Wald statistics; and the avg-Wald, the average of the Wald statistics calculated
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Table 3.3: Test for Non-linearity with U.S. Threshold Variable
Threshold Wald statistics
Specification Variable Delay Sup- Avg- Exp-
Trade Balance MA(6) GDP growth d = 1 173.8668 110.2984 82.0599
(0.0010) (0.0175) (0.0010)
Real Exchange Rate MA(6) GDP growth d = 1 165.3006 115.8488 77.7599
(0.0060) (0.0075) (0.0065)
Interest Rate Difference MA(6) GDP growth d = 2 171.8769 113.7973 81.0409
(0.0030) (0.0105) (0.0030)
Notes:
The Wald statistics are for a test of the null hypothesis of a linear model versus the alternative of a
threshold VAR model with 2 lags, threshold variable and delay parameter indicated. The p-values, given
in parentheses, were calculated using the procedures described in Hansen (1996) and Hansen (1999) with
2000 bootstrap replications.
for all values of the threshold variable.3 Finally, using the bootstrap procedure described in Hansen
(1999) I computed 2000 replications of the test statistics. P-values for the test are the percentage
of test statistics from the replications that exceeded the test statistics from my estimated TVAR
model.
The results of linearity tests using both U.S. and Canadian threshold variables are presented
in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. When using U.S. GDP growth as the threshold variable, I can reject the null
of a single regime for each specification near or below the 1% level. When Canadian GDP growth
is the threshold variable a single regime is rejected near or below the 1% level for the baseline and
interest rate specifications. For the exchange rate specification I am unable to reject a linear model
at any conventional significance level.
3.3.3 Identified Recession Regimes vs. NBER Recession Dates
How do the recession regimes identified by my TVAR model using the U.S. threshold variable
compare to the official NBER recession dates? Figure 3.1 shows a plot of the 6-quarter moving
3 Informally, the avg-Wald statistic tests for alternatives close to the null, the sup-Wald for alternatives very far
from the null, and the exp-Wald for intermediate alternatives. Note that by using these test statistics the results of
the test do not depend on the estimated threshold value.
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Table 3.4: Test for Non-linearity with Canadian Threshold Variable
Threshold Wald statistics
Specification Variable Delay Sup- Avg- Exp-
Trade Balance MA(2) GDP growth d = 1 163.3551 113.2398 76.9994
(0.0010) (0.0060) (0.0010)
Real Exchange Rate MA(8) GDP growth d = 2 120.5509 85.6761 56.0707
(0.4205) (0.5960) (0.4200)
Interest Rate Difference MA(6) GDP growth d = 1 163.5146 107.9670 76.8743
(0.0115) (0.0330) (0.0120)
Notes:
The Wald statistics are for a test of the null hypothesis of a linear model versus the alternative of a
threshold VAR model with 2 lags, threshold variable and delay parameter indicated. The p-values, given
in parentheses, were calculated using the procedures described in Hansen (1996) and Hansen (1999) with
2000 bootstrap replications.
36
U.
S.
 Q
ua
rte
rly
 G
DP
 G
ro
wt
h 
Ra
te
 
 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
6−qtr moving average
threshold value = 0.5611
Figure 3.1: TVAR Recessionary Regimes vs. NBER Recession Dates
average of U.S. GDP growth with NBER recession dates shaded in the background. My estimated
threshold value of 0.5611 is indicated by a dashed horizontal line. Areas where the GDP growth
plot falls below the line correspond to recession regimes identified by the model. Table 3.5 lists the
dates of the TVAR recessionary regimes and the NBER recession dates that fall within my sample
period of 1974:1 - 2007:4.
While the recessions identified by each overlap for the most part, the TVAR recession regimes
are on average twice as long as NBER-identified recessions (just over 8 quarters vs. an average
of 4 quarters). The 1980 and 1981-82 NBER recessions are both subsumed in one long TVAR
recessionary regime. In the case of the 2000 NBER recession there is no overlap at all – the TVAR
model identifies a recessionary regime from 2001 - 2003 instead. In the case of the most recent
recession, the TVAR model has the recessionary regime beginning in the first quarter of 2007,
rather than the fourth quarter as determined by the NBER.
The timing differences are partly driven by the fact that the NBER dates measure from the
peak to the trough of the business cycle, while the TVAR regimes may be interpreted as periods
where the economy is operating at less than potential, a condition which may begin before and
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Table 3.5: TVAR U.S. Recessionary Regimes vs. NBER
Recession Dates
TVAR NBER
Recessions length Recessions length
1974 q3 – 1975 q4 6 1974 q1 – 1975 q1 5
1980 q1 – 1983 q2 14 1980 q1 – 1980 q3 3
1990 q3 – 1992 q2 8 1981 q3 – 1982 q4 6
2001 q2 – 2003 q2 9 1990 q3 – 1991 q1 3
2007 q1 – 2007 q4 4 2000 q1 - 2000 q4 4
2007 q4 1
Notes:
TVAR Recession dates are identified by a 6-quarter moving aver-
age of U.S. real GDP growth and an estimated threshold value of
0.5611. NBER Recession dates only include those that fall within
the sample period of 1974 q1 – 2007 q4.
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persist beyond the actual trough of the cycle. In fact, as Figure 3.1 shows, local minimum points
for the threshold variable coincide pretty closely to NBER end dates. The longer duration of the
TVAR recession regimes is also a consequence of restricting the range of threshold values over
which I estimate the model. Unfortunately, this restriction is necessary to identify the model. It is
interesting to note, however, that even with this restriction I am able to reject a linear model at the
1% level. This implies that for purposes of evaluating the effects of fiscal policy, NBER business
cycle dates may not be the best measure of recessionary regimes. I am unable to make a direct
comparison because the 22 NBER recession quarters that fall within my sample are not enough to
identify the model.
3.3.4 Impulse Response Results
In this paper I only consider shocks to U.S. government spending. I make this choice for two
reasons: the first is to keep the discussion manageable - to discuss both spending and tax shocks in
the non-linear model would involve discussion of the response of five variables to eight shocks to both
sending and taxes; the second is that, as I’ve shown in other work (see Nicar (2012)), the responses
to net tax shocks are more sensitive to the identification method than spending shocks. I identify
shocks as the innovations from the government spending equation in the TVAR (ordered first) and
assume the contemporaneous relationships AE and AR have a recursive structure determined by
the Cholesky decomposition of the residual covariance matrix for each regime. This method is
the most straightforward to implement in the TVAR model and for calculation of the non-liner
impulse responses. As I’ve shown in Nicar (2012), with the specification and variable definitions
I’m using, this method of identifying shocks results in responses very similar to those found using
sign restrictions or the methodology of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
In order to exploit the features of the non-linear model, I consider eight shocks: a positive
and negative one-standard-deviation shock, and a positive and negative two-standard-deviation
shock, in each case conditional on occurring in both of the regimes. Responses to each shock
were computed for each regime and for specifications using both the U.S. and Canadian threshold
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variables. Because the linearity tests for the Canadian threshold variable provided no evidence
of non-linearity for the exchange rate specification, I do not present impulse responses for that
specification. For each regime, I treat each observation that falls into that regime as a separate
“history” and compute 500 replications of the GIRF for that history using the algorithm explained
in section 3.2.2. The mean across all replications for that history is saved as an individual realization
of the GIRF for that regime. The point estimates and quantiles presented in the tables and graphs
for each regime are the mean and quantiles across all realizations for that regime.
Figure 3.2 presents the point estimates for each shock in the recession regime using U.S.
GDP growth as the threshold variable and Figure 3.3 shows the point estimates for each shock
in the expansion regime. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 present the same using Canadian GDP growth as
the threshold variable. From these graphs it appears as though within each regime the responses
display the properties of linear impulse responses – shock linearity and shock symmetry in the
terminology of section 3.2.2. I’ll discuss the extent to which my estimated GIRFs differ from linear
responses below. I’ll begin the discussion of the impulse response results, however, by looking at a
positive one-standard-deviation shock and how the response differs across regimes. This facilitates
comparison with other results from the fiscal policy literature since this is the usual type of shock
considered.
U.S. Threshold Variable
Table 3.6 shows the responses of U.S. and Canadian GDP to a one dollar increase in U.S.
government spending and the responses of the trade balance, real exchange rate, and interest rate
differential to a one percent increase. Graphs of the impulse responses are shown in Figures 3.6
and 3.7. The point estimates are the mean response at each horizon across all histories within
the regime. The confidence intervals are given by the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles at each horizon.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, (and in contrast to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)) I find that
during a recession a $1.00 increase in government spending decreases GDP by $0.24 on impact
and the effect remains negative for the first six quarters after the shock. The peak effect occurs
40
0 5 10 15 20
−4
−2
0
2
4
x 10−3 U.S. GDP
0 5 10 15 20
−2
−1
0
1
x 10−3 Canada GDP
0 5 10 15 20
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Real Exchange Rate
0 5 10 15 20
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
Trade Balance
0 5 10 15 20
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Interest Rate Spread
 
 
+1 s.d. shock
+2 s.d. shock
−1 s.d. shock
−2 s.d. shock
Figure 3.2: TVAR GIRFs – U.S. Recession Regime
(U.S. GDP growth is threshold variable)
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Figure 3.3: TVAR GIRFs – U.S. Expansion Regime
(U.S. GDP growth is threshold variable)
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Figure 3.4: TVAR GIRFs – Canada Normal Regime
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Figure 3.5: TVAR GIRFs – Canada High-Growth Regime
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Table 3.6: IRFs by Model and Regime - U.S.
model impact 4 qrts 8 qrts 12 qrts 20 qrts Peak
U.S. GDP ($)
Linear 0.93 0.12 -0.18 -0.38 -0.33 0.93 0
GIRF - Rec -0.24 -0.69 0.49 -0.62 0.69 -1.38 1
GIRF - Exp 1.02 0.23 0.50 0.11 0.62 1.02 0
Canada GDP (CDN $)
Linear 0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 20
GIRF - Rec 0.03 -0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.09 3
GIRF - Exp 0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.08 0
Trade Balance (%)
Linear 0.39 0.89 1.04 0.94 0.51 1.04 8
GIRF - Rec -0.24 1.85 2.30 1.48 0.30 2.30 8
GIRF - Exp 0.09 1.68 2.29 1.98 0.27 2.32 9
Real Exchange Rate (%)
Linear 0.17 -0.88 -1.71 -2.29 -2.71 -2.72 19
GIRF - Rec -0.47 -5.04 -6.26 -6.46 -3.63 -6.48 11
GIRF - Exp 0.56 -3.19 -4.66 -5.35 -3.86 -5.38 13
Interest Rate Difference (bps)
Linear 10.71 -11.22 -17.74 -12.74 -5.25 -17.95 7
GIRF - Rec 37.00 0.63 -11.80 -7.83 9.06 49.97 1
GIRF - Exp 20.15 -19.68 -21.73 -16.75 2.40 -23.28 6
Notes:
For U.S. and Canadian GDP, the table gives the response to a one-period, $1
increase in the level of real U.S. government spending. For the trade balance, real
exchange rate and the interest rate difference, the response is to a one-period 1%
increase in real U.S. government spending.
in the first quarter with a $1.38 decrease in GDP. After the initial decrease the the point estimate
alternates between positive and negative $0.65, but the response is not significantly different from
zero after the first four quarters. In an expansion, there is a $1.02 increase in GDP on impact,
which is also the peak effect. The effect remains small and positive for most of the rest of the
horizon, but not significantly different than zero.
On impact and for the next two quarters the responses for the two regimes are significantly
different from each other in the sense that their confidence intervals do not overlap. After the first
two quarters there is significant overlap in the confidence intervals for the two responses, and after
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Figure 3.6: TVAR GIRFs – U.S. Recession Regime
Response to a positive 1 std. error shock to U.S. Gov’t Spending.
about six quarters the point estimates for the two regimes track each other pretty closely, though
neither is significantly different than zero.
The estimated responses of Canadian GDP to U.S. spending shocks are small in both reces-
sions and expansions. When the U.S. is in recession, a $1.00 increase in U.S. government spending
has a peak effect of decreasing Canadian GDP by $0.09 (Canadian), occurring three quarters after
the shock, and in an expansion the peak effect is an increase in GDP of $0.08 on impact. In the
recession regime, the response is never significantly different from zero, but for the expansion regime
the effect is significant on impact and for the following quarter. The responses for the two regimes
are significantly different from each other on impact and the following two quarters, but afterwards
the two confidence intervals overlap completely.
The response of the trade balance, measured as the ratio of U.S. exports to imports, is
positive and almost the same magnitude across the two regimes, at least for the first four quarters
after the shock. During a recession the trade balance drops slightly (-0.25%) on impact but the
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Figure 3.7: TVAR GIRFs – U.S. Expansion Regime
Response to a positive 1 std. error shock to U.S. Gov’t Spending.
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effect increases sharply to a positive 1.52% increase in the first quarter. The peak effect occurs in
the eighth quarter at 2.30%, gradually decreasing to 0.30% twenty quarters after the shock. The
response is significantly different from zero for the first through ninth quarters. In an expansion
the effect on impact is slightly positive at 0.09% and is almost identical to the recession response
for the first four quarters becoming a bit larger thereafter. The peak effect is a 2.32% increase in
the ninth quarter, after which the effect decreases more slowly than in the recession regime but
ends in nearly the same place at 0.27%. The response becomes significant between the fourth and
sixteenth quarters. Although the response during expansion appears to be a bit larger and more
persistent than during a recession, there is significant overlap in the confidence intervals for the
two regimes for most of the response horizon.
The response of the real exchange rate tells a similar story as the trade balance: the magnitude
and direction of the response is very close across the two regimes. In the recession regime a positive
spending shock leads to a 0.47% depreciation of the exchange rate on impact, continuing to a peak
depreciation of 6.48% eleven quarters after the shock. The exchange rate then appreciates, ending
up 3.63% below its level before the shock. The response is significant for the entire horizon. In
an expansion the exchange rate appreciates by 0.56% upon impact but then quickly depreciates by
1.70% in the first quarter, and eventually reaches a peak depreciation of 5.38% in the thirteenth
quarter. As in the recession regime, it then appreciates back to 3.86% below its level before the
shock. The response is significant on impact and after the fourth quarter. The responses across
regimes are significantly different from each other on impact, but afterwards the confidence intervals
overlap.
The initial response of the spread between U.S. and Canadian short-term interest rates to
a spending shock is positive in both recessions and expansions. There is an increase of 37 basis
points on impact in the recessions regime, peaking at a 50 basis point increase a quarter later.
The response becomes negative after five quarters, reaching a decrease of around 12 basis points
relative to the pre-shock spread, then positive again at fourteen quarters, ending at 9 basis points
above the pre-shock spread. The response is only significant for the first four quarters however. In
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an expansion there’s an increase of 20 basis points on impact, then the effect becomes negative at
three quarters, peaks at a decrease of 23 basis points in the sixth quarter, and becomes positive
again after fifteen quarters. The response is significant on impact and for quarters eight through
thirteen. As with the real exchange rate, the responses for the two regimes are significantly different
on impact, but not thereafter.
Canada Threshold Variable
As discussed in section 3.3.1, the estimated threshold values using Canadian GDP growth as
the threshold variable correspond to annual growth rates of 4.3% and 3.5% for the trade balance
and interest rate specifications, respectively. These estimates imply that the non-linearities present
in the model do not correspond to “recession” and “expansion” regimes as with the U.S. threshold
variable but are perhaps better characterized as “normal” and “high-growth” regimes. Table 3.7
shows the responses of Canadian GDP, the trade balance and the interest rate spread to a one
dollar increase in U.S. government spending when Canadian GDP growth is used to define the two
regimes. Graphs of the impulse responses are shown in Figures 3.8 and 3.9.
The response on impact of Canadian GDP to a $1.00 U.S. spending shock is positive in
both the normal and high-growth regimes. In the normal regime, however, the response becomes
negative in the first quarter, falling from an increase of $0.05 on impact to a peak decrease of $0.20
in the twelfth quarter following the shock. The response is significantly different than zero after
the fourth quarter. The positive effect is more persistent in the high-growth regime, starting at
an increase of $0.10 on impact and remaining positive until the seventh quarter. The peak effect
is a decrease of $0.17 in the twelfth quarter, but the response is not significant for the fourth
through tenth quarters. The responses are significantly different from each other through the first
six quarters. Relative to the model with the U.S. threshold variable, the responses are about the
same magnitude on impact, but larger and more persistent thereafter.
For the trade balance, the response has the same shape and similar magnitudes across regimes:
an increase (from the U.S. perspective) on impact followed by a short dip then a much larger increase
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Table 3.7: IRFs by Model and Regime - Canada
model impact 4 qrts 8 qrts 12 qrts 20 qrts Peak
Canada GDP (CDN $)
Linear 0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 -0.08 20
GIRF - Rec 0.05 -0.10 -0.17 -0.20 -0.14 -0.20 12
GIRF - Exp 0.10 0.06 -0.06 -0.17 -0.12 -0.17 12
Trade Balance (%)
Linear 0.39 0.89 1.04 0.94 0.51 1.04 8
GIRF - Rec 0.82 1.15 1.37 1.29 0.69 1.37 9
GIRF - Exp 0.26 0.90 1.22 1.25 0.84 1.25 12
Interest Rate Difference (bps)
Linear 10.71 -11.22 -17.74 -12.74 -5.25 -17.95 7
GIRF - Rec 1.82 -19.01 -15.62 -11.11 -6.81 -19.01 4
GIRF - Exp 19.25 -24.36 -21.48 -13.27 -7.12 -26.05 5
Notes:
For Canadian GDP, the table gives the response to a one-period, $1 increase in
the level of real U.S. government spending. For the trade balance and the interest
rate difference, the response is to a one-period 1% increase in real U.S. government
spending.
0 5 10 15 20
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
x 10−3 Canada GDP
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
Trade Balance
0 5 10 15 20
−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Interest Rate Spread
 
 
point estimate
2.5% / 97.5% quantiles
Figure 3.8: TVAR GIRFs – Canada Normal Regime
Response to a positive 1 std. error shock to U.S. Gov’t Spending.
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and gradual decrease. The response on impact is larger in the normal regime – 0.86% increase vs.
0.25% – but the effect peaks at a lower level – 1.37% vs. 1.25% – and decreases faster than in the
high-growth regime. In each regime the responses are significantly different from zero across most
of the horizon. The responses are significantly different from each other on impact but afterwards
the confidence intervals overlap. The responses are in the same direction but of a somewhat smaller
magnitude than when U.S. GDP growth is the threshold variable.
The initial response of the spread between U.S. and Canadian short-term interest rates to a
spending shock is positive in both the normal and high-growth regimes: 1.82 basis points and 19.25
basis points, respectively. For both, however, the response becomes negative within two quarters,
peaking at a 19 basis point decrease in the normal regime and a 26 basis point decrease in the
high-growth regime. The responses are significantly different from each other on impact but not
thereafter. In the normal regime the response is significantly different from zero from quarters
two through sixteen while in the high-growth regime the response is significant on impact and for
quarters three through eight.
TVAR vs. Linear Model
History Dependence
For many of the responses above there is a significant difference between regimes only at
impact or for at most a couple of quarters after. If there is no difference in the response across
regimes for most of the response horizon, how do the estimates compare to a strictly linear model?
Figures 3.10 (U.S. threshold variable) and 3.11 (Canada threshold variable) show the point estimates
for both regimes plotted alongside the IRFs from a linear VAR with the same variables and lag
order. I’ve also plotted the two-standard-error asymptotic confidence band for the linear IRFs.
With the U.S. threshold variable, the most notable qualitative difference occurs in the re-
sponse of U.S. GDP. The linear and expansion regime responses are both positive and of similar
magnitude on impact and for the first four quarters. The recession response is initially much lower
than the linear response, falling outside the linear confidence band. While the linear response de-
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creases for the full twenty quarter horizon, the recession and expansion regimes both show increases
in GDP after about four quarters. But after the first quarter for the recession regime, and for the
whole horizon for the expansion regime, the GIRFs fall within the confidence band for the linear
model.
The response of Canadian GDP is similar for the linear model and the GIRFs from both
regimes of the non-linear model. The GIRFs also fall well within the confidence band for the linear
model. For the interest rate difference as well, the impulse responses for both the recession and
expansion regime have the same general shape as the linear response and both fall within the linear
model’s confidence band.
Relative to the responses from a linear model, the trade balance and real exchange rate
responses move in the same direction – a depreciation of the exchange rate and an improvement in
the U.S. trade balance – but the magnitude of the response is larger than the linear model in both
cases. Moreover, the differences appear to be significant as the GIRF responses fall near or outside
the boundary of the linear model confidence bands.
With the Canadian threshold variable the biggest difference from the linear model comes in
the response of Canadian GDP, where the decline across both regimes of the non-linear model is
sharper and more persistent than the linear model response. Both of the GIRFs fall well within
the confidence bands for the linear response. For the trade balance there appears to be almost no
difference between the linear response and the response in either of the regimes from the non-linear
model. The same hold for the response of the interest rate difference.
Shock Symmetry
Shock symmetry means that means that the response to positive and negative shocks have
the same magnitude but with opposite signs. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show, for each regime and variable,
the amount by which the magnitude of the response to a positive shock exceeds the magnitude of
response to a negative shock. A positive number indicates that a positive shock has larger effect
than a negative shock at that horizon, and vice versa.
With the U.S. threshold variable, the recession regime shocks show some evidence of asym-
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Table 3.8: Shock Symmetry of GIRFs - U.S. Threshold Variable
shock size impact 4 qtr 8 qtr 12 qtr 20 qtr peak quarter
recession regime
US GDP ($) $ 1 0.04 0.50 0.11 0.35 0.10 0.72 2
$ 2 -0.04 0.20 0.03 0.24 0.08 0.27 2
Canada GDP (CDN $) $ 1 -0.01 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.09 3
$ 2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 2
Trade Balance (%) 1 % -0.05 0.16 -0.10 -0.39 -0.03 -0.71 14
2 % 0.02 0.09 -0.03 -0.22 -0.04 -0.34 14
Real 1 % -0.05 -0.12 -0.09 -0.07 -0.19 -0.19 20
Exchange Rate (%) 2 % 0.00 -0.08 -0.13 -0.15 -0.23 -0.24 19
Interest 1 % -2.30 -0.76 0.04 7.27 2.39 -11.73 13
Rate Difference (bps) 2 % 1.57 -0.41 -0.07 3.75 -0.28 -6.42 13
expansion regime
US GDP $ 1 0.01 -0.11 -0.01 0.09 0.01 -0.15 1
$ 2 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.09 1
Canada GDP $ 1 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 12
$ 2 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 1
Trade Balance 1 % -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.16 1
2 % 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.09 1
Real 1 % 0.02 -0.12 -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 -0.15 9
Exchange Rate 2 % 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.11 19
Interest 1 % -0.32 -4.28 -3.63 -1.18 -0.91 -10.11 1
Rate Difference 2 % 0.42 -2.32 -1.52 -0.50 -0.66 -4.84 1
Notes:
Each entry shows the amount by which the magnitude of the response to a positive shock exceeds
(+), or is less than (-), the magnitude of response to a negative shock.
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Table 3.9: Shock Symmetry of GIRFs - Canada Threshold Variable
shock size impact 4 qtr 8 qtr 12 qtr 20 qtr peak quarter
normal regime
Canada GDP (CDN $) 1 s.d. 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 12
2 s.d. 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 12
Trade Balance (%) 1 s.d. -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.09 13
2 s.d. 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 3
Interest 1 s.d. 0.59 2.06 1.19 0.57 0.19 2.06 4
Rate Difference (bps) 2 s.d. 0.70 0.93 0.36 -0.10 0.18 0.93 4
high-growth regime
Canada GDP 1 s.d. -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 11
2 s.d. 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 11
Trade Balance 1 s.d. -0.02 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.10 1
2 s.d. 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 1
Interest 1 s.d. -0.96 5.13 2.75 0.79 -0.80 -6.41 1
Rate Difference 2 s.d. -0.03 0.95 0.71 0.15 -0.15 1.04 5
Notes:
Each entry shows the amount by which the magnitude of the response to a positive shock exceeds
(+), or is less than (-), the magnitude of response to a negative shock.
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metric effects. For U.S. GDP the effect of a positive shock is consistently larger than the effect of
a negative shock and the difference is at times significant. For example, the peak difference occurs
in the second quarter after the shock, when a one-dollar positive shock to government spending
decreases U.S. GDP by $0.72 more than a negative shock of the same size would increase it (a
$1.27 decrease vs. a $0.55 increase). For a two-dollar shock, a positive shock has a peak differ-
ence of $0.27. For Canadian GDP positive shocks consistently show larger effects as well, but the
magnitudes of the differences are small: $0.09 and $0.03 for one- and two-dollar shocks respectively.
For the trade balance and real exchange rate the results are reversed; positive shocks consis-
tently have smaller effects than negative shocks. The peak asymmetry for the trade balance is a
difference of 0.71 percentage points in response to a 1% shock – approximately a third of the 2.30%
peak effect of spending on the trade balance in the recession regime. For the real exchange rate
the peak asymmetry is 0.24 percentage points in response to a 2% shock, which is much smaller
relative to the almost 13% peak effect that would result from a perfectly symmetric shock. For
the interest rate difference there is no pattern in the asymmetries, but the peak effect is relatively
large – the magnitude of the response to a positive 1% shock is around 12 basis points smaller than
the response to negative 1% shock, compared to a peak effect of 50 basis points in response to the
positive shock.
In the expansion regime there is no pattern to the asymmetries and in general the magnitudes
are much smaller. The peak effect for U.S. GDP is a $0.15 lower response to positive shocks relative
to negative ones and for Canadian GDP the peak difference is only $0.01. For the real exchange
rate the asymmetry is almost the same as for the recession regime while much smaller for the trade
balance. The interest rate difference is the exception here, with positive shocks showing consistently
lower effects than negative ones. The peak asymmetry of 10 basis points is almost half the peak
response to spending shocks in the expansion regime.
Using Canadian GDP as the threshold variable, I do not find any significant asymmetries.
There are no consistent patterns and the magnitudes of the differences are very small for all variables
and for both regimes.
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Table 3.10: Shock Linearity of GIRFs - U.S. Threshold Variable
shock direction imapct 4 qtr 8 qtr 12 qtr 20 qtr peak quarter
recession regime
US GDP ($) positive -0.04 -0.30 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.46 2
negative 0.11 0.31 0.06 0.15 0.00 0.45 2
Canada GDP (CDN $) positive 0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 2
negative -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 3
Trade Balance (%) positive 0.04 -0.07 0.06 0.18 -0.09 0.36 14
negative -0.09 0.06 -0.08 -0.16 -0.06 -0.39 14
Real positive 0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.12 0.12 20
Exchange Rate (%) negative -0.09 -0.02 0.06 0.12 0.21 0.21 19
Interest positive 2.88 1.33 -0.22 -4.23 -1.36 -4.23 12
Rate Difference (bps) negative -4.86 0.63 0.01 2.82 3.97 -7.20 13
expansion regime
US GDP positive 0.02 0.13 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 0.13 4
negative 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.10 3
Canada GDP positive 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 4
negative 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 4
Trade Balance positive 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 2
negative -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.08 3
Real positive -0.03 0.23 0.36 0.35 0.28 0.37 9
Exchange Rate negative -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.17 -0.17 20
Interest positive -0.50 2.16 1.02 -0.16 -0.09 -2.57 2
Rate Difference negative -1.97 -1.76 -3.21 -1.51 -0.58 -5.94 1
Notes:
Each entry shows the amount by which the magnitude of the response to a $2.00 (or 2%) shock exceeds
(+) or is less than (–) twice the magnitude of the response to a $1.00 (or 1%) shock.
Shock Linearity
Shock linearity means that the relationship between response magnitudes is strictly propor-
tional to the size of the shock – doubling the size of the shock doubles the size of the response.
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show, for each regime and variable, the amount by which the magnitude of
the response to $2.00 (or 2%) shock exceeds twice the magnitude of response to a $1.00 (or 1%)
shock. A positive number indicates that the response increases more than proportionately with the
size of the shock, while a negative number indicates a less than proportionate response.
56
Table 3.11: Shock Linearity of GIRFs - Canada Threshold Variable
shock direction imapct 4 qtr 8 qtr 12 qtr 20 qtr peak quarter
normal regime
Canada GDP (CDN $) positive -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 20
negative 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 4
Trade Balance (%) positive 0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.07 0
negative -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0
Interest positive 0.31 -1.80 -0.82 -0.38 0.01 -1.84 3
Rate Difference (bps) negative 0.08 0.46 0.85 0.97 0.03 1.23 11
high-growth regime
Canada GDP positive 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 15
negative 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 2
Trade Balance positive -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 12
negative -0.08 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.08 0
Interest positive -0.01 -2.50 -1.48 -0.07 0.86 3.40 1
Rate Difference negative -1.87 5.86 2.59 1.21 -0.44 -10.19 1
Notes:
Each entry shows the amount by which the magnitude of the response to a $2.00 (or 2%) shock exceeds
(+) or is less than (–) twice the magnitude of the response to a $1.00 (or 1%) shock.
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For the U.S. threshold variable, there aren’t any consistent patterns to the results. In the
recession regime there is little evidence of non-proportional responses for Canadian GDP and the
real exchange rate. For U.S. GDP, the trade balance and the interest rate difference there are
moderate effects. For U.S. GDP the response increases less than proportionately for positive shocks,
but more than proportionately for negative shocks, with peak differences that are nearly the same
at around $0.45. For the trade balance the situation is reversed, with responses to positive shocks
increasing more than proportionately. The peak difference for both positive and negative shocks
is around 0.36 percentage points. For the expansion regime, there is little evidence of significant
differences in the responses.
For the Canada threshold variable there is, once again, little evidence that responses are not
proportional to the size of shocks across variables or regimes.
3.4 Conclusion
My results in this paper show that allowing for nonlinearities in the responses to U.S. govern-
ment spending shocks produces some significant differences from the responses from a linear model.
Using tests for non-linear behavior I am able to reject the null of a linear model for specifications
using both U.S. and Canadian GDP growth as a threshold variable. The estimated threshold
value for the U.S. corresponds reasonably to a division between recession and expansion regimes.
For Canada however, the estimated threshold variable more closely corresponds to normal and
high-growth regimes.
When U.S. GDP growth is used to define recessionary and expansionary periods I find signifi-
cant differences on impact and for several quarters in the responses of U.S. and Canadian GDP, the
trade balance, the real exchange rate, and short-term interest rate differentials across regimes. The
difference in responses across regimes is generally not significant after a few quarters. The response
of U.S. GDP in recessionary periods and the responses of the trade balance and real exchange rate
in both recessionary and expansionary periods show significant differences from linear responses in
terms of the direction of effect (U.S. GDP) and the magnitude (trade balance and real exchange
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rate). One issue that I need to explore more is the counterintuitive direction of responses of U.S.
GDP across regimes: negative in the recession regime and positive in the expansion regime.
In addition to differences in direction and magnitude across regimes, I find evidence of other
non-linearities in the responses, particulary during recessionary regimes. U.S. GDP responds more
to positive spending shocks in a recession than to negative ones. However, the response to positive
shocks increases less than proportionately to the size of the shock, while for negative shocks the
reverse is true. For the trade balance and real exchange rate, positive shocks have smaller effects
than negative ones during a recession. The trade balance response also increases more than pro-
portionately to the size of positive shocks and less to negative shocks. In the expansionary regime
there is little evidence of asymmetry or non-proportional responses.
Using Canadian GDP growth as the threshold variable, I find significant differences across
regimes for the response of Canadian GDP, the trade balance, and the interest rate differential.
These differences are only significant on impact, however. In addition, there is little evidence of
other non-linearities in the responses in either regime. Aside from the effects on impact, there
is little difference in the non-linear and linear responses for the trade balance and interest rate
differential. For Canadian GDP, the response during the normal regime becomes negative much
earlier than in a linear model and the magnitude is larger. In the high-growth regime, the response
is larger than in a linear model for several quarters, becomes negative sooner, and then has a larger
negative response than in the linear model.
Chapter 4
Does the Effect of Fiscal Policy in Canada Differ in Recessions and Expansions?
4.1 Introduction
The recent recession has resulted in increased research into the effects of fiscal policy, most
of which has focused on the United States. While this focus is understandable given the role of the
U.S. in triggering the recession and its status as the world’s largest economy, the recession was a
global one and a number of countries instituted fiscal stimulus measures to combat the recession.
In this paper I examine the effects of fiscal policy in the U.S.’s small open-economy neighbor to
the north: Canada. In doing so I also consider whether the effect differs based on the state of the
business cycle.
4.2 Methodology
Traditional impulse responses functions are calculated by estimating model parameters for
a given sample period and then using this set of parameters for forecasting iteratively one step
ahead at a time. A potential problem with this approach is that any misspecification error will
be compounded as the forecast horizon increases. Jorda` (2005) proposes an alternative technique,
which he calls “local projection,” that involves estimating a new set of impulse response coefficients
at each horizon. Consider a vector of endogenous variables yt. The impulse response coefficients
are obtained by estimating the following equation (abstracting from constants and other exogenous
variables):
yt+h = B
h
1 yt +B
h
2 yt−1 + · · ·Bhp yt−p+1 + ut+h, h = 1 . . . H (4.1)
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where p is the lag length. Note that the superscripts on the B matrices refer to the forecast horizon
and are not exponents and B01 = I for h = 0. The impulse responses at horizon h are the elements
of the matrix Bh1 . The timing notation illustrates the relationship between local projection IRFs
(LP IRFs) and traditional IRFs calculated from VAR coefficients. When h = 0, the system in
(4.1) coincides with a VAR. This implies that for the first period after the shock (and trivially on
impact) the IRFs will be the same for both methods. But for h > 1, i.e. starting with the second
period of the forecast horizon, they will generally not be the same.
Jorda` (2005) uses a Monte Carlo experiment to show that LP IRFs are more robust to
misspecification of the model relative to the true data generation process, including lag length,
than traditional IRFs. Thus the LP approach is particularly attractive when the sample size is
relatively small, since the additional of additional lags leads to less precise estimates. A downside to
the approach from a practical standpoint is that you lose more observations than when estimating
a VAR. For example, with a VAR(p), p are lost as pre-sample values. For LP, you need to save
p+H + 1 sample values.
4.3 Empirical Analysis
4.3.1 Data and Specification
I estimate the impulse responses using quarterly data for Canada for the time period 1975Q2
- 2010Q4. I limit the analysis to the effects of changes in aggregate real government spending
per capita on the following variables: real GDP per capita, the GDP deflator inflation rate, the
interest rate on long-term government bonds, and the real effective exchange rate. In an alternate
specification I include real net exports instead of the exchange rate. Government spending, GDP,
the exchange rate and net exports in natural logs. I estimate each equation in levels, including two
lags of the endogenous variables, a constant, and a linear time trend.
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To allow for different effects across the business cycle, I modify equation (4.1) as follows:
yt+h = F (zt)B
R,h
1 yt + [1− F (zt)]BE,h1 yt (4.2)
+ F (zt)B
R,h
2 yt−1 + [1− F (zt)]BE,h2 yt−1 + ut+h
(4.3)
F (zt) =
exp(−γzt)
1 + exp(−γzt) , γ > 0
where the matrix Bi,h1 , i ∈ R,E gives the impulse responses at horizon h in recession (R) and
expansion (E). The variable zt is an index of the state of the business cycle, normalized to have
zero mean and unit variance. F (·) is a function describing the transition from one regime to the
next and the parameter γ determines the smoothness of the transition between the regimes. F (·)
takes on values between zero and one, which indicate the likelihood that the economy is in recession.
For zt I use an eight-quarter moving average of the quarterly growth rate of real GDP. I set γ equal
to 1.3 so that that the economy spends about 16 percent of the time in a recessionary regime,
with a recessionary regime defined as F (zt) > 0.8. This is consistent with the actual fraction of
recessionary quarters in Canada over my sample period. Figure 4.1 shows a plot of F (zt) against
recession dates for the Canadian economy.1
4.3.2 Results
VAR vs. Local Projection IRFs
I begin by comparing the responses to changes in government spending estimated by linear
local projections and traditional IRFs from a linear VAR(2). In both cases government spending
shocks are identified by a Cholesky decomposition with government spending ordered first. Graphs
of the impulse responses can be found in Figure 4.2. In the graphs, the shaded area shows the 95%
asymptotic confidence interval for the linear VAR and the dashed lines show the same confidence
1 The recession dates are those identified by the Economic Cycles Research Institute (ECRI) using a methodology
similar to that used to identify business cycle dates in the U.S. See http://www.businesscycle.com.
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Figure 4.1: Identified Recessionary Regimes vs. Canadian Recession Dates
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Figure 4.2: VAR IRF vs. Local Projection IRF
Each graph displays the response to a positive 1% shock to government spending.
interval for the LP IRFs.2 A comparison of peak, average and cumulative responses across all
specifications is given in Table 4.1, while estimates for the entire response horizon are detailed in
Table 4.2.
An apparent difference between the two is that the VAR IRFs are smoother, by nature of how
they are calculated, than the LP IRFs. The LP IRF confidence intervals are also slightly wider.
For the response of spending, GDP, the inflation and interest rates the estimates are nearly the
same across the entire ten-quarter response horizon. In each case the LP IRF response falls within
the VAR IRF’s 95% confidence interval. Going forward, I will use the LP responses as the reference
unless they differ significantly from the linear VAR responses. The estimates show that Canadian
GDP increases by $0.04 in response to a $1.00 dollar increase in government spending, but the
effect is not significantly different from zero. Thereafter, the effect is negative and significant at
the 10% level for much of the response horizon. Because of the narrower confidence bands on the
2 The confidence intervals for the LP IRFs are calculated according to a formula given in Jorda` (2009).
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Table 4.1: Multipliers across models and regimes
Peak
point est. std. err. quarter Average Cumulative
GDP ($)
linear VAR -1.15∗∗ (0.50) (10) -0.89 -1.26
linear LP -1.18∗ (0.72) (6) -0.73 -1.39
LP - Recession -1.75∗∗ (0.48) (5) -1.30 -3.69
LP - Expansion -0.86∗∗ (0.35) (7) -0.35 -0.84
Inflation (% pts)
linear VAR -0.17∗ (0.09) (1) -0.01 -0.01
linear LP -0.17∗ (0.10) (2) -0.02 -0.04
LP - Recession -0.15∗∗ (0.06) (2) -0.01 -0.02
LP - Expansion -0.20∗∗ (0.07) (2) -0.01 -0.04
Interest Rate (% pts)
linear VAR -0.03 (0.05) (4) -0.02 -0.02
linear LP -0.10 (0.08) (6) -0.05 -0.10
LP - Recession -0.16∗∗ (0.05) (2) -0.10 -0.27
LP - Expansion -0.13∗∗ (0.05) (6) -0.06 -0.15
Exchange Rate (%)
linear VAR 0.59∗ (0.37) (10) 0.31 0.44
linear LP -0.86∗ (0.46) (4) -0.33 -0.62
LP - Recession -1.11∗∗ (0.22) (4) -0.48 -1.36
LP - Expansion 1.02∗∗ (0.34) (9) -0.14 -0.33
Trade Balance (%)
linear VAR -0.63∗∗ (0.17) (8) -0.53 -0.76
linear LP -0.36 (0.28) (6) -0.14 -0.26
LP - Recession -0.33∗ (0.18) (6) -0.05 -0.14
LP - Expansion -0.32∗∗ (0.16) (6) -0.05 -0.12
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linear VAR IRFs, the effect is significant at the 5% level except on impact. The peak effect is a
decrease in GDP of $1.18 in the sixth quarter after the shock. The immediate and peak response
of inflation is a decrease of 0.17 percentage points, significant at the 10% level. The effect remains
negative and significant for the next two quarters, but thereafter is close to zero and not significant.
The effect on the interest rate is slightly negative, peaking at a decrease of 0.10 percentage points,
but is never significantly.
For the exchange rate and trade balance there’s more divergence between the VAR and LP
impulse responses. In the VAR model, the response of the exchange rate is small and negative on
impact but the effect becomes positive after a quarter, peaking at an appreciation of 0.59 percent-
age points in the tenth quarter after the shock. The peak effect is significant at the 10% level.
In the LP model, the effect is negative over the entire horizon peaking at a depreciation of 0.86
percentage points. The peak effect occurs earlier, in the fourth quarter, and is significant at the
10% level. In addition, the LP response falls outside the 95% confidence interval for the VAR
response in quarters three through eight. For the trade balance, the VAR response is persistently
negative and significant at the 95% level, with a peak decrease of 0.63 percentage points in the
eighth quarter after the shock. The LP response is also negative but smaller in magnitude, often
twice as small, with a peak decrease of .36 percentage points, but the effect is never significant.
The LP response does, however, fall outside the VAR 95% confidence band after the fourth quarter.
Recession vs. Expansion Regimes
Figure 4.3 shows the impulse responses, along with 95% confidence bands, for the recession
and expansion regimes. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the recession and expansion regimes compared to
the linear LP responses. The most significant difference across regimes, and relative to the linear
model, is in the response of GDP. In the recessionary regime, GDP falls on impact by $0.34 in
response to a $1.00 increase in government spending, while in the expansionary regime it increases
by $0.33. In both cases the response on impact is significant at the 10% level. In a recession, the
response continues to be negative, peaking at a decrease of $1.75 in the fifth quarter after the shock.
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Figure 4.3: Recession Response vs. Expansion Response
Each graph displays the response to a positive 1% shock to government spending.
Thereafter it increases through the tenth quarter, ending at a decrease of $0.89. The response is
significant over the entire horizon, and on impact through the third quarter there is no overlap in
the confidence intervals for the recession and expansion responses. The recession response is more
negative and significantly different than the response from the linear model as well, on impact and
for the following two quarters. In the expansion regime, after the initial positive response, the effect
becomes negative, peaking at a decrease of $0.86 in the seventh quarter. Relative to the response
from the linear model, the expansion response is less negative but never falls outside the linear
model’s 95% confidence interval.
For inflation, the response in both the recession and expansion regimes is qualitatively the
same as the linear model – a small decrease which dissipates within three quarters. In both regimes
the effect is significantly different than zero through two quarters after the shock, but the difference
across regimes is never more than 0.10 percentage points and is not significant. Quantitatively, the
response in both recessions and expansions is nearly the same as the response in the linear model.
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Figure 4.4: Recession Response vs. Linear Response
Each graph displays the response to a positive 1% shock to government spending.
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Figure 4.5: Expansion Response vs. Linear Response
Each graph displays the response to a positive 1% shock to government spending.
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For the interest rate, the response in recessions and expansions follows the same pattern, with
the response in the recession regime more negative through six quarters. The difference between
the two regimes is only significant when the recession response peaks at -0.16 percentage points in
the second quarter. This peak, while larger in magnitude than the linear response, still falls within
the 95% confidence interval for the linear response. The response in the expansion regime is nearly
identical to the linear response.
The response of the exchange rate in recessions and expansions is nearly zero on impact and
negative for the first three quarters after the shock. Thereafter, the recession response remains
negative, falling outside the expansion confidence interval after the seventh quarter. In contrast,
the expansion response becomes positive and peaks at an appreciation of 1.02% in the ninth quarter
after the shock. The recession response is nearly identical to the linear response,while the expansion
response is more positive after the sixth quarter. Neither the recession nor the expansion responses
fall outside the 95% confidence interval for the linear response.
There is virtually no effect on the trade balance on impact in the recession regime, while in
the expansion regime there is a decrease of 0.21%, which is significant at the 10% level. In the
recession regime the effect hovers around zero but becomes negative after the fifth quarter, with a
peak effect of -0.32% in the sixth quarter after the shock. Though the expansion response begins
negative, it returns to near zero after two quarters and is nearly the same as the recession response
thereafter. Neither response ever falls outside the 95% confidence interval for the linear response.
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper I have estimated the response of several Canadian macroeconomic series to
shocks in government spending using local projections. These responses are more robust to mis-
specification of the empirical model than traditional IRFs calculated from a VAR. I found, however,
that in most cases there was no significant difference in the LP responses and VAR IRFs. The
exceptions were the real exchange rate and the trade balance. Then, using local projection IRFs,
I estimated the response in recession and expansion. With the notable exception of GDP, I found
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that the responses across regimes was generally not significant in a statistical or qualitative sense
and not statistically different from the linear LP response. For GDP I found that the response to
government spending shocks is negative in both recessions and expansions, but the magnitude of
the response in recession is significantly larger. The recession response is significantly different, and
larger, than the response in the linear LP model as well.
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Appendix A
Data Appendix
A.1 Data and Tests for Chapter 2
Variable Descriptions and Sources
Data for the U.S. variables are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). Bilateral trade data are from the BEA’s International
Transactions Accounts. Foreign data is from the International Monetary Fund’s International
Financial Statistics Database. U.S. NIPA and IMF data are seasonally adjusted by the source.
International trade are seasonally adjusted by me using the U.S. Census Bureau’s X12-ARIMA.1
Variable names and definitions are presented in Table A.1.
All real variables except the real exchange rates are calculated as nominal variables deflated
by the appropriate GDP deflator. U.S. real net taxes are from NIPA Table 3.1 and calculated as
the sum of Current Tax Receipts (line 2), Contributions for Government Social Insurance (line 7)
and Current Transfer Receipts (line 11) minus the sum of Current Transfer Payments (line 17),
Interest Payments (line 22) and Subsidies (line 25). Interest rate differentials are calculated as
the U.S. rate minus the foreign rate. Ex-post real interest rates are calculated by subtracting the
year-over-year CPI inflation rate. The real bilateral exchange rate is calculated as:
Nominal Exchange Rate (units of foreign / $ U.S.) × US CPI
Foreign CPI
.
1 I used the IRIS Toolbox for Matlab for this. https://code.google.com/p/iris-toolbox-project/.
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Table A.1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
usrgdp Natural log of U.S. Real GDP per capita
usrgs Natural log of U.S. Real Government Consumption and Investment per capita
usrnt Natural log of U.S. Real Net Taxes per capita
cargdp Natural log of Canada Real GDP per capita
jprgdp Natural log of Japan Real GDP per capita
ukrgdp Natural log of U.K. Real GDP per capita
castrd U.S./Canada short-term real interest rate differential
jpstrd U.S./Japan short-term real interest rate differential
ukstrd U.S./U.K. short-term real interest rate differential
carxr Natural log of U.S./Canada bilateral real exchange rate
jprxr Natural log of U.S./Japan bilateral real exchange rate
ukrxr Natural log of U.S./U.K. bilateral real exchange rate
catb Natural log of U.S./Canada real bilateral trade balance
jptb Natural log of U.S./Japan real bilateral trade balance
uktb Natural log of U.S./U.K. real bilateral trade balance
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The trade balance is calculated as the log ratio of exports to imports. In order to maintain consistent
orders of magnitude across variables, all bilateral trade balances and the real exchange rates for
Canada and the U.K. were multiplied by 10.
Unit Root Tests
Each variable was tested for the presence of a unit root using the Dickey-Fuller GLS and
KPSS tests. For the DF-GLS the null hypothesis is a unit root. For the KPSS test the null
hypothesis is stationarity. The tests were conducted in Stata using the dfgls and kpss commands.
Table A.2: Unit Root Tests
Variable DF-GLS KPSS
with trend
usrgdp reject at 5% fail to reject at 10%
usrgs fail to reject at 10% reject at 1%
usrnt fail to reject at 10% reject at 1%
cargdp fail to reject at 10% reject at 1%
jprgdp fail to reject at 10% reject at 1%
ukrgdp fail to reject at 10% reject at 1%
no trend
catb fail to reject at 10% reject at 1%
jptb fail to reject at 10% fail to reject at 10%
uktb fail to reject at 10% reject at 10%
carxr fail to reject at 10% reject at 1%
jprxr fail to reject at 10% reject at 1%
ukrxr fail to reject at 10% reject at 1%
castrd fail to reject at 10% reject at 10%
jpstrd fail to reject at 10% fail to reject at 10%
ukstrd reject at 1% reject at 1%
Cointegration Tests
Given the evidence of non-stationarity in most of the variables, each specification was tested
for cointegration using the Johansen methodology. The tests were conducted in Stata using the
vecrank command. Each specification included U.S. government spending, net taxes, GDP, and
foreign GDP, with the trade balance, real exchange rate and interest rate differential rotated in as
the fifth variable.
77
Table A.3: Cointegration Tests
Test 5%
Specification Test r Statistic Critical Value
Canada
Trade Balance Trace 0 73.92 68.52
1 44.44∗ 47.21
Max. Eigenvalue 0 29.48∗ 33.46
1 26.59 27.07
Exchange Rate Trace 0 83.37 68.52
1 44.68∗ 47.21
Max. Eigenvalue 0 38.70 33.46
1 24.02∗ 27.07
Rate Spread Trace 0 75.22 68.52
1 38.39∗ 47.21
Max. Eigenvalue 0 36.82 33.46
1 21.06∗ 27.07
Japan
Trade Balance Trace 0 68.94 68.52
1 39.79∗ 47.21
Max. Eigenvalue 0 29.15∗ 33.46
1 17.29 27.07
Exchange Rate Trace 0 71.22 68.52
1 39.62∗ 47.21
Max. Eigenvalue 0 31.60∗ 33.46
1 19.34 27.07
Rate Spread Trace 0 77.88 68.52
1 44.37∗ 47.21
Max. Eigenvalue 0 33.51 33.46
1 25.76 27.07
U.K.
Trade Balance Trace 0 75.46 68.52
1 33.21∗ 47.21
Max. Eigenvalue 0 42.24 33.46
1 17.24∗ 27.07
Exchange Rate Trace 0 75.26 68.52
1 30.29∗ 47.21
Max. Eigenvalue 0 45.00 33.46
1 16.35∗ 27.07
Rate Spread Trace 0 70.07 68.52
1 29.86∗ 47.21
Max. Eigenvalue 0 40.21 33.46
1 17.56∗ 27.07
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VAR Specification
Although there are some ambiguities in the cointegration test results, most specification seem
to have one cointegrating relationship. Therefore, the models are estimated in levels rather than
first differences. VAR specifications were chosen as the minimum lag length for which the residuals
were uncorrelated.
A.2 Data and Tests for Chapter 3
Variable Descriptions and Sources
The variables used in Chapter 3 are the same as those used in Chapter 2. See description in
section A.1, above.
Unit Root Tests
See unit root tests in section A.1, above.
Cointegration Tests
Each specification included U.S. government spending, GDP, and Canadian GDP, with the
trade balance, real exchange rate and interest rate differential rotated in as the fourth variable.
Table A.4: Cointegration Tests
Test 5%
Specification Test r Statistic Critical Value
Trade Balance Trace 0 43.58∗ 68.52
1 17.36 47.21
Max. Eigenvalue 0 26.22∗ 33.46
1 12.33 27.07
Exchange Rate Trace 0 56.09∗ 68.52
1 19.10 47.21
Max. Eigenvalue 0 36.99 33.46
1 11.68∗ 27.07
Rate Spread Trace 0 53.65∗ 68.52
1 19.13 47.21
Max. Eigenvalue 0 34.52 33.46
1 15.84∗ 27.07
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VAR Specification
Although there are some ambiguities in the cointegration test results, most specification seem
to have one cointegrating relationship. Therefore, the models are estimated in levels rather than
first differences. VAR specifications were chosen as the minimum lag length for which the residuals
were uncorrelated.
A.3 Data and Tests for Chapter 4
Variable Descriptions and Sources
Data are from Statistics Canada, except the long-term interest rate which is from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics. All real variables are calculated as nominal variables deflated by
the GDP deflator. The GDP deflator inflation rate is calculated year-over-year.
Table A.5: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
cargs Natural log of Canada Real Government Consumption and Investment per capita
cargdp Natural log of Canada Real GDP per capita
deflinfl Canada GDP deflator inflation rate
ltintrate Nominal interest rate on long-term government bonds
canx Natural log of real Net Exports
carxr Natural log of Real Effective Exchange Rate
Unit Root Tests
Table A.6: Unit Root Tests
Variable DF-GLS KPSS
with trend
cargs fail to reject at 10% reject at 1%
cargdp fail to reject at 10% reject at 1%
no trend
deflinfl fail to reject at 10% reject at 1%
ltintrate fail to reject at 10% reject at 1%
canx fail to reject at 10% fail to reject at 10%
carxr fail to reject at 10% reject at 5%
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Cointegration Tests
Each specification includes Canada government spending, GDP, GDP deflator inflation rate,
and long-term interest rate, with real effective exchange rate and trade balance rotated in as the
fifth variable.
Table A.7: Cointegration Tests
Test 5%
Specification Test r Statistic Critical Value
Exchange Rate Trace 0 76.84 68.52
1 41.36∗ 47.21
Max. Eigenvalue 0 35.48 33.46
1 23.11∗ 27.07
Trade Balance Trace 0 85.21 68.52
1 39.72∗ 47.21
Max. Eigenvalue 0 45.49 33.46
1 23.41∗ 27.07
VAR Specification
For both specifications the tests indicate a single cointegrating relationship. Therefore, the
models are estimated in levels rather than first differences. VAR specifications were chosen as the
minimum lag length for which the residuals were uncorrelated.
